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Abstract This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment has per
se an epistemic superiority over the method of computer simulation, a view that has
been rejected by some philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds
have been hard to pin down by its defenders. I further argue that this superiority does
not come from the experiment’s object being materially similar to the target in the
world that the investigator is trying to learn about, as both sides of dispute over the
epistemic superiority thesis have assumed. The superiority depends on features of
the question and on a property of natural kinds that has been mistaken for material
similarity. Seeing this requires holding other things equal in the comparison of the
two methods, thereby exposing that, under the conditions that will be specified, the
simulation is necessarily epistemically one step behind the corresponding experiment.
Practical constraints like feasibility and morality mean that scientists do not often
face an other-things- equal comparison when they choose between experiment and
simulation. Nevertheless, I argue, awareness of this superiority and of the general
distinction between experiment and simulation is important for maintaining motivation
to seek answers to new questions.
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If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not
merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system
of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions “How did he overcome
the force of gravity?” “How could he live without an atmosphere?” and a thousand others which
could not be answered. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, c. 1950 (published 1969)
It is madness and a contradiction to expect that things which were never yet performed should be
effected, except by means hitherto untried.
— Sir Francis Bacon (1620, Part 1, Sec. 1, Aphorism 6)
1 Introduction
The method of experiment, in which we compel nature, under controlled conditions, to
answer the questions we ask, has long been seen as what distinguishes modern science
from its ancestors. The method of computer simulation first showed its effectiveness
through its indispensable role in the design of the thermonuclear bomb (Galison 1997,
pp. 689–780), still perhaps the most spectacular demonstration of Francis Bacon’s
dictum that knowledge is power. Contemporary science and life are suffused with
computer simulation, but for all the usefulness of this method there remains a steady
strain of the opinion that was there from the beginning, that computer simulation
is inferior to experiment for gaining knowledge of the world. In recent times many
philosophers have denied this thesis that experiment is superior to computer simulation,
and supporters have had difficulty defending the intuition.
I will argue that grounding a thesis about the superiority of experiment requires clar-
ity about the purpose for which the methods are compared, and the quantificational
structure of the claim, and that it can, and can only, be supported by an explicitly other-
things-equal argument. Both defenders and detractors of the superiority of experiment
are mistaken, I will argue, in the assumption that it depends on the study sample in
an experiment being materially similar to the target in the world that the investigator
is trying to learn about. The relevant factor is not material similarity but a kind-
hood with which nature is replete, but that can also be found in manufacturing, and
for which material similarity is neither sufficient nor necessary. Practical constraints
like feasibility and morality mean that scientists do not often face an epistemically
other-things-equal comparison when they choose between experiment and simula-
tion. Nevertheless, I argue, awareness of this superiority and of the general distinction
between experiment and simulation is important for maintaining motivation to seek
answers to new questions.
Scientists have all sorts of reasons to do simulations, and all sorts of purposes to
which they put experiments. The superiority thesis I will defend concerns simulations
that aim to answer a specific, determinate question about the actual world, a question of
the sort an experiment is often used to answer. The scope of the claim does not include
the use of simulation to “explore a topic”, and does not include its use for heuristic
purposes—to discover hypotheses worth testing or experiments worth doing, or what
is possible as opposed to actual. It does not include the use of simulation to explore the
dynamical dimensions and potential of a model, or as a method of design, or as a tool
to aid classic experimentation—for example for preselecting setups, simulating data,
or analyzing the results of experiments—or for discovering possible explanations of
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a known phenomenon, or for pedagogical purposes.1 The thesis does not claim that
there is something that no simulation could ever do, such as discover novelties (cf.
Parke 2014).
The existence of hybrids that display elements of both experiment and simulation
does not undermine my appeal to a difference between the methods since there exists
a recognizable distinction between the two, discussed below, that applies to enough
clear cases to make a claim of principled advantage important. The considerations in
this paper will make it clear that there is no need to abandon wholesale the common
practice of judging the epistemic value of cases by among other things their status
as simulation or experiment, as has been urged by Parke (2014). We can continue
with these judgments provided we keep in mind the conditions under which the status
reveals anything, and what it does and does not reveal. As I argue below, this practice
has a positive role in maintaining motivation to seek answers to new questions.
2 Materials and methods
There is a persistent intuition that experiments are more direct than simulations, that
they are in a more direct relationship to the object of study, the material world, and that
this is what makes them superior. This intuition surely has a role in the concern that
has been expressed among some experimental physicists that simulations will come
to be preferred because they are generally cheaper, and that this will inhibit discovery
of new facts about the world (Humphreys 2004, pp. 133–134). After all, it has been
said, a simulation can only reveal the consequences of knowledge we already possess,
or, as Herbert Simon put it, “a simulation is no better than the assumptions built into
it” (Simon 1969, p. 18).
This latter intuition is supported by the idea that a computer simulation is merely
calculating the consequences of a set of theoretical assumptions. There would thus
be no information in the results of the simulation that were not already present in the
theoretical assumptions—garbage in, garbage out. However there are two problems
with this idea about why computer simulations are inferior at bringing new knowl-
edge. First, even “mere” calculation can give us new knowledge, for the fact that
information is present in theoretical assumptions does not mean that we know what it
is. Analogously, the fact that what determines the outcome of an experiment is already
present in the substrate it is performed on does not mean we know what it is, and
no one thinks that makes an experiment trivial or unable to bring new knowledge.
Moreover, to the extent that we know that theoretical assumptions are accurate about
the world, a surprising result of calculation from them gives us some new purchase
on the world. It has been argued further that simulations can yield surprises and novel
discoveries in the same ways that experiments can (Parke 2014; cf. Morgan 2005),
and I will not dispute that point. My interest here is not in the possibility of discovery,
of possibilities or actualities, but in the strength of the justification the two methods
can yield for answers to questions about the actual world.
1 A variety of these uses of simulation can be seen in the process of designing the first thermonuclear bomb,
and in experiments to detect “golden events” in particle physics (Galison 1997, pp. 689–780).
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In trying to locate an inferiority for simulation one might think that even if a simula-
tion surprises us, the epistemic value or justification of the new beliefs about the world
that we form on the basis of the simulation’s results is no better than that of the theory
from which it produced the calculations, since the simulation has no grounds inde-
pendent of our trust in the theory. However, in fact a computer simulation’s results
do have sources independent of the theory, since it is a long road from theoretical
assumptions to a “solver,” the computer program that will give the final results (Mor-
gan 2002, 2003, 2005; Humphreys 2004; Winsberg 2010). The solver is the product
of theoretical ideas, analogies, approximation techniques, replacement, pre-existing
pieces of code, ingenuity, and necessity. It has a life of its own; its credentials are
evaluated independently of the theory and it is typically the solver, not the theory, that
is revised when predictions resulting from a simulation face recalcitrant experience.
The multiple sources from which a simulation is constructed could even bring a
positive epistemic advantage; their carrying support independently of the theoretical
assumptions and of each other could form the basis for an abductive inference to the
best explanation, from the fact that a simulation “works” in mimicking an effect to the
deeper resemblance of its model to the way the world is. At least, it is not clear why
such an inference would be any worse off than the analogous inference for a theory
or hypothesis. That at least some evaluation of a simulation is done independently of
evaluation of the theory is the second problem with viewing a simulation as merely
calculating the consequences of theoretical assumptions.
If a simulation has enough distance from the theoretical assumptions to give it an
independent status, perhaps a difference in status between simulation and experimen-
tation can be located in the former having too much distance from the target system,
the part of the world that the two methods can be used to tell us something about. On
one such view, whereas in an old-fashioned experiment one is “controlling the actual
object of interest, …, in a simulation one is experimenting with a model rather than
the phenomenon itself.” (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999) An immediate problem with
this view is that the actual object of interest of a scientist conducting an old-fashioned
experiment to test a hypothesis often extends beyond the sample that can be manip-
ulated in the lab. When Ernest Rutherford first argued that the atom has a nucleus,
he used experiment on gold samples to draw a conclusion about the structure of all
atoms, including those in gold outside the lab, and also those in lead, and hydrogen,
and phosphorus.
In order to draw conclusions about the world from a model one must make assump-
tions about its similarities to the target system, so a model may be thought to be
epistemically further from the wide world’s atoms than a sample of gold is because
a model cannot have the degree of similarity to the world that a chunk of the world
has. But as evident to us as it may be, the claims that the gold in the lab is similar
to all other gold and to lead, and hydrogen, and phosphorus, in the relevant respects
are also assumptions that must have been justified if the results on the sample of gold
were to be generalized to all atoms. In both simulations and experiments the object
acted upon is separated from the world that one often wants to learn about by a layer
of assumptions of relevant similarity. The strength of justification that we have for
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those assumptions depends on the case and is not determined by whether the study is
an experiment or a simulation (Parker 2009; Winsberg 2009, 2010).2
Another popular way of attempting to make out the intuition that experiment is
more direct than simulation focuses on the kind of similarity that obtains between
study system and target system. A gold sample is materially similar to all other gold,
and to lead, hydrogen, and phosphorus, in the relevant respects, whereas a computer
model is similar to the target system only in virtue of its form (Morgan 2002, 2003,
2005; Guala 2005). This, according to what is called the Materiality Thesis, makes
generalization of the study’s results to the target more justified. Both defenders and
detractors of the superiority of experimentation take it to depend on some version of
the Materiality Thesis (Durán 2013).
Some critics of this approach have said that the distinction between formal and
material similarity is confused (Winsberg 2010, p. 62), because for any two material
objects one can find a formal similarity. All objects have both sorts of properties, of
course, and the fact that living things and petroleum are not only both self-identical
but also both composed largely of carbon and hydrogen atoms would not incline us to
experiment on petroleum in order to learn about mice. However, this does not mean
that material properties are not specially important or distinct from formal properties,
but only that any property, material or formal, may be insufficiently relevant to a given
question for a similarity with respect to that property to be helpful. Among the relevant
properties a distinction, albeit vague at the boundary, can be made between those that
are material and those that are formal. A wooden table and chair are materially but
not formally similar. A wooden camshaft is formally but not materially similar to a
steel camshaft. And a theoretical model of a physical process may be formally but is
definitely not materially similar to the thing it models.
The material-formal distinction is clear enough, and tracks something in the dif-
ference between experimentation and simulation. The real challenge for the view that
material similarity makes an experiment superior is to explain why this distinction
makes any principled difference to the strength of justification of conclusions. Several
authors claim that material similarity is always relevant:
We are more justified in claiming to learn something about the world from the
experiment because the world and experiment share the same stuff. In contrast,
inference from the model experiment is much more difficult as the materials are
not the same—there is no shared ontology, and so the epistemological power is
weaker. (Morgan 2005, p. 323; cf. Guala 2002, 2005; Harré 2003, pp. 27–8.)
but the claim that “ontological equivalence provides epistemological power” (Morgan
2005, p. 326) gives no guidance as to why this special similarity matters to justification.
One might think that material similarity has more to offer because it offers a greater
degree of similarity than formal similarity does, and thereby more strongly justifies the
“back inference” to the target (Harré 2003, pp. 27–28). However a material similarity
claim cannot justify our back inference to the target unless it is itself justified. If a
claim of material similarity is strictly stronger than a claim of formal similarity then
2 I say “often” because sometimes the goal of an experiment is primarily to learn something about the
sample in the lab rather than to generalize the results or test a more general hypothesis.
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that would suggest it is more difficult to justify.3 At least, it would be the burden of
the advocate of the Materiality Thesis to say why not. If the material similarity claim
more strongly supports the back inference because of its logically stronger content,
what we trade for this is the claim’s own level of justification. From this it seems that
reliance on a claim of material similarity could put the experimenter at a justificational
disadvantage.
Even if a claim of material similarity is justified, it is hard to see why we should
think material similarity is strictly stronger than formal similarity. Clearly material
similarity does not imply formal similarity. Animal fur can be made into a cap or a
coat, ceramic into a plate or a cup. The different objects rendered in fur and in ceramic
respectively are not only formally different but topologically different. You cannot put
your arm through a cap without tearing it. Grabbing a plate with a curled finger would
be challenging. Two objects being materially similar does not even make it more likely
that they are formally or topologically similar.
The most compelling and popular suggestion about why material similarity makes
experiment stronger comes from what Francesco Guala calls “blackboxing” (Guala
2002). Having a chunk of the world in the lab appears to let the experimenter get
away with less commitment than the simulator.4 Experimenter and simulator must
both insure that their study systems are dynamically similar to the target system.
The simulator does this by making in her study system a model of the dynamics of
the target system. By contrast operating on a sample of the target system relieves the
experimenter of the need to make a model of that system. On this way of defending the
superiority thesis, if the experimenter has reason to believe his sample is made of the
same stuff as the target, that entitles him to assume it will behave the same way as the
target, without making commitments about how it does so. Rutherford could suppose
that the sample gold behaves like all other gold in the relevant respects—whatever
they are—because they all are gold. The experimenter’s claim that object and target
are the same stuff must be justified, of course, but the simulator must go further, to
make specific commitments about what the dynamics of the target system are. Thus the
simulator seems to be strictly further out on a limb. Her claim is not merely a generic
one of formal or dynamical similarity of her system and the world but similarity with
respect to, say, A, B, C, D, and E. With this in mind it is no longer obvious that
the same-stuff similarity claim the experimenter makes is harder to justify than the
similarity claims of the simulator; the latter are more specific and so logically stronger.
Though Eric Winsberg rejects the idea that experiment has a principled superiority
over simulation, he concludes on the basis of careful analysis of real cases that the
fact that simulators model the target system and experimentalists do not have to is the
defining difference between the two methods (Winsberg 2010, pp. 64–70). Neverthe-
less, as a way of defending superiority for experiment Guala’s blackboxing idea faces
3 It does not imply this, of course, since in mathematics it can be easier to prove a logically stronger theorem
than a weaker one due to the way the content is stated. But even in mathematics we would not expect this
to be true in every case or every type of case.
4 Cf. Bogen and Woodward (1988, pp. 326–336), who argued that experimenters need not make a model
that explains the data in order to evaluate the reliability of that data, which is important for understanding
experiments generally.
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problems. One is that the argument appears not to show superiority in principle or
in every case, for there are many cases where we have models that are well accurate
enough to do the simulations we need to answer the intended question. The experi-
menter may be able to blackbox in these cases and avoid commitments, but it would
give him no epistemic advantage.
A second problem is Guala’s assumption that material similarity is what makes
black-boxing legitimate.5 Material similarity is supposed to underwrite the legitimacy
of assuming that the lab sample of gold will behave as all other gold does. We saw
above that little follows from similarity of material properties, and this would seem
also to apply to behavior: rubber can be made into a tire or a ball, which are formally,
topologically, and dynamically different. Guala’s blackboxing requires that similarity
with respect to material properties be a reason to expect similarity with respect to other,
unknown properties, and it is unclear what that would be based on. A higher degree
of similarity with regard to any given set of properties does not by itself imply more
reliable projections on unknown properties. Green jadeite and green nephrite are more
similar to each other with regard to color and other properties detectable by the senses
than either of these rocks is to lavender jadeite. However, lavender jadeite would give
more reliable projections of green jadeite’s specific gravity than green nephrite would.
The other-things equal argument that follows identifies why, and the conditions
under which, black-boxing implies epistemic advantage. I also argue that the justifica-
tion of black-boxing does not depend on material similarity, and cannot be defended
on the basis of material similarity, but depends on properties of kinds. Thus, we will
see that though detractors of the superiority of experiment are right to deny the Mate-
riality Thesis, they are wrong to think that that undermines the case for an epistemic
superiority of experimentation over simulation.
3 Other things equal
Morrison (2009), Parker (2009), Winsberg (2009), and Parke (2014)) have denied
that the difference between material and formal similarity has epistemic significance
per se, and for that reason denied the generalization that experiment is a superior
method. In partial support of these claims, Parker and Winsberg point out that some
simulations are better than the experiments that we are able to do in pursuit of the
same question, despite the fact that the experiments would be much more materi-
ally similar, for example, same-stuff models of weather and same-stuff models of
black holes (Parker 2009, p. 492; Winsberg 2010, p. 61). However, this point is not
probative for two reasons. One is the qualification to experiments that we are able
to do. That there are questions for which the simulation we are able to do is more
reliable than any experiment we can do gives no reason to deny the superiority of
a comparable experiment that we cannot, or cannot yet, do. Even when methods
5 But one does not have to specify the full set of structural equations governing the target system. The trick
is to make sure that the target and the experimental system are similar in most relevant respects, so as to be
able to generalise the observed results from the laboratory to the outside world. Experimenters make sure
that this is the case by using materials that resemble as closely as possible those of which the parts of the
target system are made (Guala 2002, p. 12).
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cannot be carried out they can often be compared for what information and justifi-
cation they would give if they could be carried out, and the superiority claimed here
is epistemic, not pragmatic. The fact that we do not have the ability to experiment
on black holes is not relevant to what an experiment would give us if it could be
done.
Secondly, the claim “experiment is superior to simulation”, as the thesis is often
stated, is ambiguous, not only between epistemic and practical yardsticks of compar-
ison but also between several different quantificational structures and scopes. It could
mean that all simulations are inferior to the kind of knowledge and justificational sta-
tus one can get from any good experiment, or that for every simulation there exists a
possible experiment that is superior to it. The first claim is too strong to be defensible,
the second too weak to be very significant. We have the capability, surely, to make a
simulation of a simple, familiar system that could achieve as good a justification for
its conclusion as a good experiment on some more complex, unfamiliar system can
achieve for its. And though for every simulation on something there exists a possi-
ble experiment on something else that would get us more or higher quality epistemic
goods, this is surely also true in reverse.
Winsberg (2010, pp. 70–71) admits what he calls the epistemological priority of
experiment to simulation, by which he means that since the knowledge you need in
order to simulate is always quite sophisticated, the ability to construct a simulation
at all depends on a history of learning things from observation and experiment, from
manipulating the world itself when you did not already know how it works. This is
the claim that if no experiment had existed no simulation would exist, overall and in a
given domain, and Winsberg is right to think that it is not strong enough to support a
thesis that current simulations are inferior to experiments, now that we do have a great
deal of background knowledge. But that is partly because the claim is very weak and
the superiority thesis is still unclear.
All of the blank generalities considered above as possible statements of the superi-
ority thesis will fail because whether one method is superior to another depends on the
question they are to be used to address. Thus, a superiority thesis with plausibility and
significance will be relativized to the question, rather than comparing simulations on
some questions to experiments on other questions. Given a question about the actual
world that you don’t know the answer to, which method should you ideally choose for
answering it? I will argue that if the answer to your question is determined in part by
something you do not know, then, under a condition identified below as what justifies
blackboxing, you are always epistemically better off with an experiment. This is all
under the assumption that what you do not know is also something you do not need
to know in order to know that an experimental result answers the question (internal
validity), a qualification I will take as understood and omit repeating. The priority
thesis allows that we now know enough to answer some questions by simulation, but
the fact that we know enough to answer some questions by simulation does not mean
that we know enough to answer any given question as well as an experiment on that
question could.
To achieve generality in the superiority claim it must be made relative to the ques-
tion; no one should expect that an experiment on question p will be superior to a
simulation on q, for all p and q. Analogously, no one should expect that an experiment
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carried out by a novice will always be superior to a simulation carried out by a mas-
ter, so we will assume that both the experimenter and the simulator have equal and
adequate skill for their tasks. It is not possible to evaluate whether there is a general,
principled advantage to experiment unless we isolate the epistemic difference that
being an experiment or a simulation makes. That is, we must compare the two meth-
ods holding other things equal on a given case, holding everything the same except the
fact that one study is an experiment and the other a simulation. The other-things-equal
comparison will allow us to see the significance of the ability to blackbox and that its
justification does not rest on material similarity.
Parker recognizes the need for an other-things-equal comparison but despairs of
defining this phrase in the current context since it seems impossible to make the
““same” intervention or make the “same” observations in two experiments [studies]
in which the systems being intervened on and observed are quite different in material
and structure” (Parker 2009, p. 492).6 However, the equality needed is not material
or structural; it is epistemic. The crucial and neglected factor that must be held equal
for our purposes is the background knowledge the two investigators have. There is
no reason to expect, for example, that an experiment will be superior to a simulation
made by a scientist who already knows the answer, but that does not undermine a
claim of superiority. My strategy in what follows will be to make explicit some of
the epistemic properties that do not distinguish the methods of experimentation and
simulation, of which there are many. Then, the relevant difference will emerge when we
consider an actual experiment and constructively imagine the best possible simulation
for addressing the same question, that is similar to the experiment in every epistemic
respect that a simulation can be.
For all their material and structural differences, the methods of experiment and
simulation are remarkably similar epistemically, in ways that Galison (1997), Parker
(2008), and Winsberg (2010) have brought out. Both methods in the uses I am focused
on employ a stand-in, a study system whose results are to be generalized to a target
system. In experiments this is typically a hunk of the world. In computer simulations it
is a formal computational model. In both cases the justification for that generalization
goes by way of establishing relevant similarity between the study and target systems, of
whatever sort, by whatever means. Both experiments and simulations are run. That is,
they are dynamical processes initiated by the functional equivalent of an ON switch.
In both experimentation and computer simulation these processes are concrete. In
experiment this is obvious; for example, Rutherford’s alpha particles are shot at thin
gold foil and follow a trajectory dictated by physical law. In computer simulation,
the process is a computation governed by dynamical laws encoded in a program. A
computation is a physical process. That is, in perfect analogy to an experiment the
computer program constitutes a set of dynamical laws that govern the time evolution
of hunks of hardware, typically made of silicon. A program is not a concrete entity, but
neither are the laws of physics. What both sets of laws govern are concrete processes.
Both methods are interventions in a broad sense. When the switch is flipped on, an
6 In this context she is using the term “experiment” broadly to encompass both traditionally-styled exper-
iments and simulations.
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initial state—whether this is flying alpha particles and a sheet of gold, or numerical
inputs and their associated silicon—is set free to do its work according to the laws.
Both kinds of studies have outputs at the end of the process that are typically called
“data”, and in both methods the data must be interpreted in order to have results. To
do this, one must verify that the intended intervention (physical process, computation)
was actually performed, that the data actually reports the desired quantity, and that
control for irrelevant factors was achieved. Debugging a program is epistemically
analogous to tinkering with a concrete experimental apparatus to make it intervene or
measure as intended. In both methods, the claim that the apparatus or program does
what is intended is verified by benchmarking, that is, comparing the results to known
endpoint values, and to the results of other studies. Results so certified can be used
to justify conclusions about the target system, provided a claim of relevant similarity
between study- and target- system is justified.
That there is such a raft of important similarities may be surprising but it should not
mislead us; that two things have many similarities does not show they have no relevant
difference. To compare the powers of the aspects of the two methods that are different,
we must imagine them to be aiming to answer the same question. Even if a given
climate simulation is just as good, or better, at answering its questions as economics
experiments on crowds of people are at answering theirs, it is not to the point of
the superiority thesis. Moreover, the question addressed must be determinate. Such a
question would be, for example, what the scattering pattern of a type of particles is
under a particular set of conditions, or what the trajectory and evolution of a particular
hurricane will be, and epistemic success is finding the correct answer or having strong
grounds for believing you have.
Simulations and experiments are also used to do things like “study phenomenon X”
and “explore topic Y” but the aim of activities so described is diffuse and what would
count as success is not sufficiently specified to make a comparison ahead of time of
the two methods’ ability to achieve it. Experiments and simulations are both used to
study dynamics and to explore the evolution of organisms, and both have the capacity
to teach us things, but this does not tell us what goal a superiority claim would be
about in such cases. Finally, the question I will assume both methods are supposed to
answer is about the actual world. It has been argued convincingly that simulations can
be superior in some contexts for discovering possibilities that had not, and perhaps
could not, be exposed in experiments on actual stuff, but that is not the topic here.
The epistemic difference between the two methods that is salient to my superiority
claim is best developed through an example. Rutherford’s (1911) paper that explained a
variety of scattering results via a nuclear model of the atom is remembered as decisive
(Rutherford 1911). The experiments by Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden (Geiger
and Marsden 1909; Geiger 1910) showing back deflection of alpha particles which
are remembered as particularly well explained by Rutherford’s nuclear interpretation
provide examples of a comprehensible and significant type of experiment. It answered
the clear question of what is the deflection pattern of alpha particles shot at gold
foil a few atoms thick. At the time of Rutherford’s nuclear interpretation, physicists
knew about electrons, their mass and single negative charge, and that the atom was
electrically neutral, and so, that because it contained electrons the atom must also
contain positive charge. However, they did not know how the positive charge was
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distributed. J. J. Thomson’s “plum-pudding” model dominated, and in this picture the
positive charge was uniformly distributed over the atom.
In the short version of the story, the fact that some alpha particles were scattered
through a wide angle when they were shot at a very thin gold foil, and sometimes even
deflected almost all the way back, could only be explained by supposing the atom had
a nucleus, because otherwise nothing in the atom would have enough density or charge
to deflect the hefty alpha particle that strongly. In the more detailed version, this exper-
iment, even when combined with all of the other scattering phenomena Rutherford’s
model could explain, was not taken to be decisive, in part because investigation of the
atom via scattering had multiple unknowns concerning the structure of the atom, and
the scattering properties of the projectiles. Other aspects of the structure of the atom
than the distribution of its matter and charge also affected how it would scatter alpha
particles. For example, Thomson’s model, which had only compound scattering, could
explain the back deflection if the radius of the atom as a whole was exceedingly tiny,
and while Rutherford evidently thought this was implausible, atomic radii had not yet
been measured.7 Unknowns that affect the results are among the chief reasons exper-
iments are conducted, and we will see that they are crucial to the difference between
what our two methods can possibly achieve in a given case.
To see the difference between one of the alpha-scattering experiments and an other-
things-equal simulation we distinguish knowns and unknowns in the former. Many
relevant matters in addition to those listed above were already settled. In addition to
knowing the mass and charge of electrons, they knew that alpha particles were helium
atoms stripped of their electrons and having a +2 charge and 8000 times the mass of
an electron. Experimenters had the ability to collimate beams of alphas to shoot at very
high speed at small targets, and to make a foil of gold thin enough that an alpha should
be meeting atoms only a few at a time. By the time of Rutherford’s interpretation,
atoms were known to have a number of electrons that was, conservatively, no more
than ten times the atomic weight of the atom, a matter relevant to whether electrons
sprinkled over the atom would have the heft in mass to deflect an alpha strongly.
The first step in constructing a simulation that is epistemically equal to an alpha-
scattering experiment is to take all of the things the experimenters knew and did
not know and suppose that the simulator has the same epistemic status toward those
matters. Since the simulator knows those things the experimenter knows, ideally she
can program her model to fulfill them, to work the same way. For example, she can
program simulacra alphas with the right “charge” properties, where that means they
respond to simulacra positive and negative charge by changing the analog of their
positions in the way that physical charges do, according to the Coulomb force. This
programming requires skill, but so do the tasks of control and isolation of variables
7 Rutherford was proposing a model that included multiple innovations: a nucleus, treatment of the alpha as a
point mass, and single collisions rather than only compound scattering. Thus, despite his obvious confidence,
his argument took the form of an inference to the simplest explanation of a variety of experimental results,
rather than an argument that his was the only possible explanation. After his 1911 paper was largely ignored
he recognized that he would not persuade his colleagues until he derived and tested radioactive, chemical,
and spectroscopic predictions of his model. Maybe this period of obscurity for his nuclear hypothesis is
largely forgotten because it was so short. Rutherford got the project of deriving further predictions started
soon after when Niels Bohr joined him in Manchester in 1912 (Heilbron 1968, pp. 300–305).
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that prepare the experiment. We hold the skill levels of the two investigators equal,
and of a level adequate to take advantage of all of the background knowledge we have
supposed they both have. We hold equal the tools that the two have at their disposal by
supposing both have whatever they need. For example, we suppose the simulator has
as much computing power as she needs, and the experimenter has the best materials
and devices.
The key question in constructing this simulation is what the programmer is to do
about the experimenter’s unknowns. Experimenters did not know the radius of the
atom, its distribution of positive charge, or number of electrons, among other things.
These unknown matters play a role in determining the deflection pattern for alpha
particles, and can do so, and be known to do so, without becoming known in the
process. When alphas are shot at thin gold foil something happens in the foil and
consequently to a circular scintillation screen surrounding the foil, which records the
hits and yields the raw data of where the alphas landed, and the experimenters do not
need to know the structure of the atom in order for this evolution to occur, or in order
to interpret the results as wide-angle deflection of alphas by atoms. In the simulation
there has to be an analogous computation or evolution, yielding numbers as data. What
should that part of the program look like, and what will the programming decisions be
based on? Assumptions will need to be incorporated, corresponding to the structure
of the atom. Otherwise there will simply be no data about what an “alpha” does in
response to an “atom.”8
No experimenter at the time could be confident about these features of the atom, so
the other-things-equal simulator could not piggy-back on them. An arbitrary choice
about them would make the data resulting from the simulation meaningless. One could
program multiple simulations based on a variety of different hypotheses about atomic
structure, and this would be a fine thing, but this would be the epistemic analog of
what Rutherford and Thomson actually did in constructing their theoretical models and
determining what followed from them mathematically.9 Those types of calculations
could give no answer at all to what alphas actually will do when shot at a thin metal
foil.
Whatever an experiment does give us in this case, an other-things-equal simulation
on the same question would seem to have nothing comparable to offer. If the simulator
were to program something to determine the scattering pattern of “alphas” she would
be either begging the question of how alphas scatter when shot at atoms or, at least
indirectly, making use of results of previous experiments on that question. At a later
8 It may be objected that simulators do not always go about programming by attempting to mimic literally
the parts and properties of the natural system. This is true but makes no difference in the kind of case we
are considering. The simulator needs to program something non-arbitrary in order to get a non-arbitrary
answer to the question, and the fact that the world determines the answer in part by the atom either having
or lacking a nucleus is all that anyone had to go on at that point. Programming something that mimics the
behavior without an effort at a realistic model is not possible because no one knows what the behavior will
be.
9 Note that this comparison does not assume that the solver in a simulation is a theoretical model. It is
what it is, but just as for a theoretical model, when initial conditions or inputs are inserted, mathematical
computation, whether human or machine, will yield values or outputs. Those values are relative to the model
or solver.
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point in history, previous experiments would give support for a hypothesis about the
structure of the atom, which then could be relied on in the programming of subsequent
simulations. There is a possible simulation that gives a non-question-begging answer
to the question, but the programmer would have to help herself to more background
knowledge than the experimenter needed, or actually existed in 1910, so that simulation
would not be other-things-equal to the experiment epistemically.
4 Blackboxing and background knowledge
The kind of unknown that the advantage of experiment over simulation rests on is a
key to explaining how an experiment can teach us anything at all about the world.10
These are unknowns that play a role in determining the result, but do not themselves
need to be known ahead of time or even described, or even learned via the experiment,
in order for us to interpret the results of the experiment as giving an answer to the set
question. Geiger and Marsden could be non-committal about the structure of the atom
during and after their experiments, as long as they knew that what was determining
the scattering result was the structure of the atom, which they could know in part by
insuring that the sheet of metal was made of atoms and was only a few atoms thick.
The ability to so interpret the results while yet refraining from assumptions about some
things in the structure of the atom is indeed what allows the results of the experiment
to independently test a variety of models of that structure.
The results of an other-things-equal simulation that posited assumptions for the
unknowns about the structure of the atom would obviously not provide a test of those
assumptions that was independent of them, since the results would be in part deter-
mined by those assumptions. Interpreting the results of the corresponding experiment
depends on assumptions too, of course, the assumptions about what I have called
“knowns”. But these are assumptions to which the simulator also helps herself, and
they do not get her to the finish line. Holding other things equal, the simulator must
make more specific commitments about the unknown structure and dynamics of the
world in order to give an answer to the question.
The conditions under which experiments are and are not epistemically superior
to simulations divide neatly along the lines of whether there is or is not a particular
kind of unknown in the question being investigated. Neither the experimenter nor the
simulator has knowledge of the unknown matters that affect the results, but at least the
experimenter will witness their consequences in his results. It looks like this argument
can be run for the epistemic superiority of an experiment over the other-things-equal
simulation for any case in which there are elements in the experimenter’s study system
that affect the results and are unknown.
In contrast, in the extreme case, if there are no such unknowns then there is nothing
epistemic to point to that the simulation corresponding to the experiment lacks. If
there were nothing unknown to us about the structural properties of the atom or alpha
particles that played a role in determining the deflection of alphas, then since we would
ipso facto have true beliefs about these matters, the simulator would—assuming as
10 See fn. 5.
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we are sufficient programming and modeling skills—have the means to construct a
program based on those beliefs that would yield the same results that the world, as
acted on in the experiment, would give. But then, in this case no one would expect an
experiment to be superior. This addresses the first difficulty with Guala’s blackboxing
idea, that it does not show a superiority in every case. There is no reason that it should
show a superiority in every case; if the simulator has a good enough model of the study
system to answer a given question, then the ability to refrain from making assumptions
gives no advantage, and we should not have thought it would. A superiority claim need
not hold in all possible cases in order to be general and principled.
One might think it would always be reassuring to do the experiment, even if a
simulation apparently has all of the background information it needs and has been
benchmarked (Guala 2002; Morgan 2005). This can also be explained, because even
if you do actually have enough background knowledge to make a simulation that will
answer your question, it is a different thing to know that you know. An experiment on
the same question can provide an independent check that you do.
A good way to test whether my view agrees with our experience is to consider the
following implication of my point. If I am right then it should be that in cases where you
do trust that a simulation is good enough to answer a question about the actual world,
then you believe that we have enough knowledge of what determines the answer to
write a program that will compute it (assuming again the required programming skill).
Many of the questions that scientists actually use simulations to answer are cases that
they regard as falling well enough into this category, where our beliefs about the deter-
minants of the behavior of interest are already so well justified that doing an experiment
would have no marginal benefit. A mixed example that illustrates this point, and that
includes a variety of questions whose answers do and do not depend on unknown fac-
tors, is the way that simulations and experiments are used to understand the principles
governing protein folding (Freddolino et al. 2010; Piana et al. 2011, 2014).
Protein folding is studied by both experiment and simulation, with simulation stud-
ies pushing the envelope on space and time scales that experiments currently cannot
reach. Experimental techniques have reached an impressive capacity for direct exami-
nation of this process, but they have not yet advanced to a degree that enables scientists
to follow trajectories at an atomic level of resolution, and at a time resolution high
enough to capture intermediate states of the faster folding proteins. However, we know
enough about the physical fields generated by the individual constituents of an amino-
acid chain, the atoms and molecules, to build computational models. The folding of a
protein is determined by the molecular and atomic properties of each amino acid and
its parts, the sequence of the amino acids in a chain, and the properties of the envi-
ronment, e.g. the temperature, and the pH and other properties of the solvent, usually
water, and these are all factors we know a great deal about taken individually.
How the forces brought by individual atoms add up to a field of forces when they
are combined into amino-acid molecules, linked in a chain, and placed in water is
not feasibly calculable from differential equations, but one way it can be modeled
is by numerically solving Newtonian equations of motion for systems of interacting
particles, in a method called molecular dynamics (MD). The forces and potential
energies of the protein are calculated from molecular mechanics force fields that are
hypothesized based on known properties of the constituent atoms and molecules. Thus,
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what we do know allows scientists to narrow the possible force fields substantially and
non-arbitrarily; in making simulations scientists are not wasting computer time with
stabs in the dark. Among other outputs these models generate values for some general
quantities relating to the kinematics and thermodynamics of folding, such as rates and
free energies of folding, that are among the things that can be measured experimentally.
Whether the two match is used to test how well the computational models capture the
dynamics and the physical force field of a protein, and new validations of this sort are
seen as required for every new development in a simulation.
Besides the computational challenge of the sheer volume of sampling required for
protein folding simulations the limiting factor currently is the accuracy of the model
of the force field that a chain of amino acids creates, because the atomic-resolution
trajectories depend sensitively on these fields. We do not know by experimental exam-
ination what the force fields are at the atomic level of resolution, but simulators are
essentially doing an inference to the best explanation of the success of the computa-
tional model’s outputs in matching features that are antecedently known, such as the
structure of the fully folded protein, and quantities that can be measured in experi-
ment, to the hypothesis that their model correctly captures that field, hence that the
intermediate states of folding that the simulation produces can be trusted.
The writing and reasoning of authors in this field betrays no doubt at all that if we
had the techniques to examine the process, and the field of forces of such molecules, at
the atomic level via experiments on actual proteins that would give us better evidence
of the dynamics and intermediate folding states than we can gain from simulations
they have built so far. To see why, we must hold other things than the method equal by
supposing that the experimenter and simulator are equally skilled relative to their tasks,
and that the experimenter is as justified in his claim to be measuring atomic structure
of intermediate folding states in his sample (internal validity), as the simulator is in
her claim that given outputs of her program are solutions to the intended equations
(verification). If so then an experimenter would not need to do what the simulator
does, inventing and adding in to the computational template features that will mimic
hydrogen bonding and atomic polarization, and hoping that they work like the real
thing in the respects that are relevant to the time evolution of the protein’s structure.
Experimenters would not have to do this modeling because the protein molecules
would be producing the intermediate folding states on their own. If experimenters
could examine the intermediate states then they could blackbox the dynamics and sit
back and watch.
There could come a point where the simulator’s inference to the best explanation
is so strong that we take the simulation as reliable for predicting or depicting protein
folding in general, its use saving us the cost of molecule preparation and subtle physical
equipment. But that would be because, or if, the simulation has reproduced many
properties that can be directly measured in experiments. The more features on which
the experiment validates the simulation the more we can trust the simulation on its own.
In the limit we could trust the simulation to identify an intermediate protein structure
accurately just as much as we would an experiment, for any purpose at all, but that
would only be because experimentation would have validated it on every dimension.
An other-things-equal simulation can be just as good as an experiment if there
is nothing in the experimental system that affects the results and is unknown to us,
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and we can know that it is just as good if we know this. There are any number of
questions for which this condition is not fulfilled, cases like how a protein folds and
the deflection pattern of alpha particles at the time the answers were still unknown,
and they exceed our current imagination; to imagine them would require imagining
everything we do not know. Though there are questions we haven’t even formulated
on which experiment is superior to simulation, there are also any number of questions
on which it is not. This second set contains questions that are not only possible for us
to answer by simulation, but also often easier for us to know how to ask. It is obviously
valuable to answer many of those questions, but if the superiority argued for here is
denied, then it follows that science would be no worse off for knowledge if we ignored
the first kind of question. That does not seem plausible.
Winsberg’s priority thesis admits that we have to have some knowledge gained by
experiment in order to succeed in constructing any simulation at all. The other-things-
equal argument has exposed a stronger and more specific sense in which the priority
of experiment never goes away. On a given question posed in an experiment, and with
a given set of background knowledge sufficient for the experimenter to get the study
system to answer the question, the simulator cannot get the answer unless we suppose
that the background knowledge includes the relevant determinants of the experimental
result, in which case no one would think we would need to do an experiment in order
know the answer. To get the answer to a given question the simulator must be given
more background knowledge than the experimenter needs. Epistemically, the method
of simulation is always one step behind.11
5 Matter doesn’t matter
Blackboxing allows the experimenter to get by with less background knowledge
than the simulator needs in order to get an answer, but justifying blackboxing also
requires background knowledge, and it is here that one might think material simi-
larity between the study and target systems gives an advantage. Geiger and Marsden
had the gold itself, where the simulator has nothing. However, material similarity
per se is not essential to the argument, because material similarity is neither suf-
ficient nor necessary to justify black-boxing. We will see that what is essential to
a case in which the simulator is one step behind is not only (1) as above, that the
outcome of the experiment is in part determined by facts that are not known to the
scientist, but that do not need to be known in order to interpret the outcome as answer-
ing the set question, but also (2) that the sample and the target are of a kind whose
kindhood can be legitimately projected into the unknown properties that determine
11 This does not imply that simulation is always behind temporally, that a simulation cannot be done until
the experiment is done, or that we cannot go very far without actually doing the experiment. We may never
actually be able to do a full weather experiment, but we have simulations that can predict it with impressive
reliability. This is possible in part because we have a strong understanding of the fluid dynamics and of
many of the other physical processes involved, and partly because simulators can do abductive inferences
as described above. But though in this way simulations can become reliable enough for our purposes, it
is still the case that if we lack full knowledge of the determinants of the behavior the other-things-equal
experiment would be superior.
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the answer to the question. In many cases this will be a natural kind, but artefac-
tual kinds can be just as good. However we will see that material similarity is not
even extensionally equivalent to the concept that must be used to justify blackbox-
ing.
For blackboxing to be justified we must be justified in believing that the sample
is similar to the target in the unknown properties that determine the answer to the
question. In our example, we need to be justified in believing that the sample gold is
similar to other gold and other elements in the unknown feature that determines the
deflection pattern of alphas: the distribution of positive charge in the atom. As we saw
above, material similarity is inadequate to insure such a thing. Material similarity does
not make formal, topological, or dynamical similarity more probable. It does not per
se make any other kind of similarity of properties more probable. In our case all atoms
of gold could be materially similar in having the same quantity of positive charge; that
does not imply that the charge is distributed the same in all of them.
What justified believing that all of the gold atoms had their positive charge dis-
tributed in the same way, and hence justified blackboxing, was that the experimenters
were justified in believing that gold is a natural kind. All atoms of gold (modulo
isotopes) share not only their known non-relational properties but also all of their
unknown non-relational properties. The intuition about the superiority of experiment
in the case of Rutherford scattering is so strong because the elements (and sub-atomic
particles) are the strongest natural kinds in the scientific pantheon. They are model
natural kinds.
Something weaker but similar obtains for molecules like proteins. They are made
of atoms, and have characteristic behaviors and fields that depend systematically on
the properties of the particular atoms the amino acids are made of, and the order in
which the latter molecules fall in the sequence. Every carbon atom under the same
conditions is the same, and will, other things equal, react the same way to changes
in environment, e.g. in pH, and in what other atoms it is exposed to or attached to.
If there is something we do not know about the protein and that the answer to our
question depends on, then the sample in the lab can nevertheless be trusted to behave
just as other instances of the protein would under the same conditions.
What natural kinds are, how to define them, and whether particular cases in science
count are all rich and complex questions that cannot be settled here. However, we
need not take a stand on every question for the notion to serve our purposes. For
example, for our purposes natural kinds may but need not have essences—necessary
and sufficient conditions for membership in the kind—because not all properties need
to be projectible for a particular question that an experiment seeks to answer. We need
not be natural kind realists for whom natural kinds are entities; we may be naturalists,
who simply think that some classifications are genuinely more natural than others. We
need not agree on an account of what it is that makes something a natural kind, either,
for example, whether there are universals. The one feature that is crucial here is that
natural kinds support inductive inference, a property that everyone accepts natural
kinds have, whatever one might think the metaphysical basis for this is (Bird and
Emma 2017; Quine 1969).
The elements (modulo isotopes) and sub-atomic particles are special cases of natural
kinds because we think members of these classes share every non-relational property.
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For that reason their kindhood will be projectible to the non-relational properties
relevant to any question at all about them, and this extreme feature explains the strength
of the intuition that experiment is superior in cases involving the elements and sub-
atomic particles essentially. We will see below that study and target systems sharing
natural kindhood to that extreme degree is not necessary to justify blackboxing on a
given question, and sharing natural kindhood merely in some respect or other is not
sufficient. We will also see that the kind need not be natural but may be artefactual.
However, this special case of strong natural kindhood gives us guidance toward what
the needed condition is.
That study and target system merely share a natural kind is not sufficient to justify
blackboxing because being members of a natural kind does not imply that two things
are the same in every property, or indeed in any property relevant to a given question.
Superficially, human being is some kind of natural kind, but that does not mean we
can assume that the liver of every human being will respond the same way to a drug.
We know that the natural kind human being does not provide similarity to a level of
specificity sufficient to insure this. We must pick more specific kinds—e.g., human
men aged 40–55 with or without hepatitis, and otherwise random—in order to be
able to project that the liver response in the study population is the same as what the
target population would have. To justify blackboxing the kind must be projectible in
particular to the unknown properties on which the answer to the experiment’s question
depends.
The members of a justifying kind must be similar in the unknown properties on
which the answer depends, but the members of a justifying kind need not share all
properties. It is possible to have a kind projectibility that justifies blackboxing even if
the study and target populations are also members of different kinds. This is because
two things can simultaneously be members of one kind and members of different
kinds. A red ball and a red cube provide a toy example. For a realistic example, scien-
tists have sometimes judged it appropriate to draw conclusions about the toxicity of
chemicals for human beings on the basis of experiments on mice.12 This is because,
or to the extent that, they are justified in believing that human beings and mice belong
to a kind, perhaps mammal, some of whose organs will respond similarly to chemi-
cals when appropriately adjusted for dosage. The similarity of two species in known
properties can justify a projection to their similarity in the unknown properties that
determine reactions, despite the fact that the two species are also different kinds, and
different in many other properties, known and unknown, that are not relevant to the
reaction. Which properties we need to project the kind to depends on the question,
and that projectibility can co-exist with a great deal of difference in other properties.
Shared relevant kindhood is necessary to justify blackboxing, but not extreme natural
kindhood of the sort we have with the elements.
Material similarity is not sufficient for shared relevant kindhood – as we saw above
with examples like the rubber ball and tire with their different dynamical properties—
12 The claim that animal testing is predictive of human response has come under criticism in recent years.
(See, e.g., Davis et al. 2013; Shanks et al. 2009). It is clear that whether an animal model is predictive
depends on the species and on the question. The point here is only that it is possible for members of two
quite different kinds to also belong to a kind that makes projection on the relevant feature justified.
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and so not sufficient to justify blackboxing. Material similarity is also not necessary,
because it is not necessary in order for two things to be members of a projectible
kind. Hollow cylindrical solid objects are all of a kind, as are cubical solid objects.
A cubical solid object whose side is the same length as the diameter of a hollow
cylindrical object will not fit into the latter, and this can be expected in every sample
whether the objects are made of wood, plastic, or melamine. Two different isotopes of
an element are materially different, having different numbers of neutrons, but many
chemical experiments on one isotope will be generalizable to the other isotopes. Or
imagine that aliens who were visually indistinguishable from humans but made of
some other material arrived unannounced and assimilated into human communities
over generations, none of them ever exhibiting behavior outside the human statistical
norm. The results of behavioral experiments on a random sample of the population
that included aliens, would be projectible to the human population, because the rele-
vant type is abstract, behavioral, and shared. Shared kindhood is necessary to justify
blackboxing, but material similarity per se would be necessary for blackboxing only
if the world were entirely lacking in multiple realization.
Though natural kinds provide the easiest way to see the point about experiments,
the kinds that justify blackboxing can also be artefactual, for example when mass man-
ufacturing produces artefactual kinds that are projectible because of the uniformity
of the production process over all of its instances. The Continental ExtremeContact
DW is a model of tire, all instances of which have the same material and formal
properties, within manufacturing tolerances. Controlled tests on samples of such a
type are used to rate all members of the type, and the ratings are published to help
consumers make informed decisions. This particular tire model has good dry trac-
tion, but less steering-responsiveness than its close rivals in the market, according to
the testers at tirerack.com. We trust that the tests on a sample of tires indicate how
other tokens of the tire type will perform because even if we do not know the struc-
ture or composition of the rubber—it may be a proprietary secret—we have good
reason to believe properties relevant to performance are the same in the samples
as in the tires the consumer might buy. In this case, rather than being a gift from
nature this follows from the consistency of manufacturing that survival in a com-
petitive market requires. Either way, we have reason to believe that study sample
and target are of the same kind in the properties we don’t know that determine the
result.
One might suspect that with artefactual kinds we have come around to simulation
and are not seeing an advantage for experiment. However, the performance of that
tire type is not being simulated in these road tests. A simulation of tire performance
would involve making a model of the tire and watching how it fares in simulated
conditions. If there is anything we do not know about what makes the tire have the
behavior it does on the road, then we are much better off testing tires that are sam-
ples of the type—that is, doing the road test—than we are with simulation tires on
simulation roads. Maybe the manufacturer knows exactly the structure of the rubber
in its tire, down to the microlevel, and exactly how that will affect its response to
turning and wet and dry surfaces, in which case a computer simulation should be
entirely satisfying. But even if the manufacturer could satisfy itself of this—which is
doubtful—consumers and independent testers do not have the knowledge to make a
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simulation. It is fortunate for the consumer, then, that a test on a sample tire is at least
as good as anything the manufacturer can do to determine its performance properties.
The fact that a tire is an artefactual rather than natural object doesn’t make a test of
the tire a simulation.
Because I have argued that whether in a given case experiment is superior depends
on whether there are unknown features that determine the answer to the question, one
might have the impression that a key to the superiority of experiment is its ability
to pick up on unknown unknowns. Whatever the unknown features are, whether we
are aware of them or not, they will act in a sample in the same way as they do in
the target of the same kind.13 However, the existence of unknown unknowns is not
necessary for justifying the blackboxing that makes an experiment superior on a given
question. There did not need to be unknown unknowns relevant to the question what the
deflection pattern of alphas would be. The known unknown of distribution of positive
charge was sufficient to give experiment the advantage.
Whether we think there are unknown unknowns does affect our judgment in a given
case that a simulation is good enough, because for that judgment, on this view, one must
judge that there are no unknowns—known or unknown—that affect the phenomenon
of interest enough to make a difference to the outcome for our purposes. But one can
make the negative judgment that there are too many unknowns to make a simulation
adequate, without any of those being unknown unknowns. The existence of unknown
unknowns is not necessary for experiment to be superior. It is also not sufficient, since
even when unknown unknowns exist they may play no role in determining the outcome
of an experiment. In comparison of experiment and simulation invocation of unknown
unknowns can be misleading.
6 The possibility of experiment
Supposing I am right that experiment is epistemically superior other things equal, under
the specified conditions, why does it matter when our options in practice actually are
constrained pragmatically and our choices are not typically between otherwise equal
studies? Obviously, we cannot do a total climate experiment that will tell us what we
want to know in time for it to be helpful, and should not detonate nuclear missiles
when we have signed a test ban treaty, or deliberately infect human beings with a
13 This point is also sometimes used to argue against a general superiority for experiment because the
unknowns may interfere with the experiment getting the right answer. However, while, as I argue in the
text, the existence of unknown unknowns does not automatically make experiment superior, it also does not
undermine the superiority claim. A simulator who puts factors in by hand indeed avoids unknown factors
that might interfere in an experiment, precisely because she does not know about them. But whether this
general fact is significant depends on the particular case and must be subjected to an other-things-equal
comparison. An interfering factor may be a known unknown, such as a magnetic field opposite the gold
foil that re-collimates the alphas before they reach the scintillation screen. But known unknowns are down
to the skill of the experimenter—if he does not check for such a magnetic field, which is easy to do, then
he does not have master skills, as we have supposed both investigators do. If an interfering factor is an
unknown unknown, then this affects the set of target cases that the experimenter’s result can be extrapolated
to, but it does nothing to remove the advantage that the experimenter has by operating on the same natural
kind: the simulator’s study is not affected by unknown unknown features of the world, but she still lacks a
non-arbitrary answer to the question because nobody knows the distribution of charge in the nucleus.
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disease. Why does it matter that these experiments would have higher epistemic value
if it is not possible or ethical to do them anyway?
Keeping in mind the epistemic advantage that experiment has matters because it
affects our consideration of what is possible, and even what is possible itself. Our
only option is indeed to do the best we can within our budget, abilities, and moral
commitments, but budgets and the boundaries of what is possible for us also change
in response to our actions. After driving a rental sports car one might decide that
owning one is worth economizing in the rest of one’s life in order to save up for it. An
analogous point holds for funding science; reducing the number of simulation studies
funded might make an experiment on a harder question affordable. It might not be
easy to take this consideration into account in pairwise comparison of the quality and
significance of proposed studies, but it could be applied at a more global level of
choices among funding strategies and incentive structures. It’s no use denying that
the sports car performs better in acceleration, speed, and handling. The only question
is the practical one whether that added value is affordable and worth it given your
goals.
Not only budgets, but the boundaries of what is possible for us can change, shrinking
or expanding in response to our actions. There are cases in which we face the choice
of whether to act to make future experimentation on a subject matter impossible.
Since smallpox was eradicated in 1980 it has regularly been proposed that the official
remaining stockpiles of the variola virus that causes it be destroyed in order to reduce
the risk of future infections.14 (Butler 2014) In recent years studies by the World
Health Organization and the American Academies of Arts and Sciences have identified
specific, medically beneficial research that we could not do if we destroyed the last
known stockpiles of this virus, because we do not have sufficient knowledge of the
virus to answer them by simulation. As long as there remain matters about how the
virus works that are unknown to us there will exist questions that we can only answer by
experiment, even if we cannot formulate them. Guessing whether these are important
questions when you do not know what they are is challenging. However, destroying
the virus would make it impossible for us to answer any of them, whatever they
are. Thus, given that the stakes in this case involve the possible death of millions
of people, it would be rational to take the kind of superiority of experiment argued
for here into account in any decision about whether to destroy all of the virus we
have.
What is possible for us can not only shrink by our own hand, but also expand in
response to our efforts. The boundaries for this cannot always be established a priori.
It is easy to think that they can because as Hume pointed out, habitual assumptions
can masquerade as necessary truths:
14 The range of considerations is complex. One might think that eradication of the official stockpiles
would make medical and bio-terrorism research unnecessary, but there has never been an attempt to verify
that there are no unofficial stocks, and some even think it likely that there are. Anyway, say retentionists,
the DNA sequence of variola is now in the public domain, so a terrorist could make his own. So also
could vaccine researchers, say destructionists, if the need ever arose. Might there be unknown differences
between manufactured and natural viruses? If so then the researchers without the natural virus would be
behind terrorists with the natural virus.
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Such is the influence of custom, that, it not only covers our natural ignorance,
but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found
in the highest degree. (Hume 1999, p. 110)
There are many experiments it seems we cannot do, but it also once seemed impossible
to see the surface of the moon—until Galileo used a telescope—or to measure the
speed of light or the density or rotation of the earth. And who would have thought
we could do an experiment in which the structural properties of an invisible entity
like DNA would make observable differences? One would not have thought it was
possible for Michelson and Morley to move the earth relative to the sun, and one
would have been right, but by being clever they did not have to move the earth in order
to do an experiment that would expose relative speeds of light if they existed. Once
we have become accustomed to these as actualities it can be easy to forget that they
once seemed impossible or even absurd. If experiments are superior in the way argued
here, then avoiding classification of epistemic value by means of the categories of
experiment and simulation could discourage us from maximizing our potential to gain
knowledge, by discouraging us from asking questions that, given our current state of
knowledge, could only be answered by experiment. Scientific progress depends on a
healthy suspicion toward our current perceptions of the boundaries of the possible.
Presumption that the boundaries of the possible are clear has in turn a practical effect
on those boundaries through the psychological mechanism of motivation. Belief that
something is impossible does not imply that it is impossible, but it does mean that
one has no subjective reason to make the effort, and thereby that a rational person
will not actually make the effort. We may even be attracted to believing that a thing is
impossible in order to excuse ourselves from making the effort. You can’t win if you
don’t play, as the lottery people tell us, so belief that a thing is impossible prevents us
from achieving it, at least with the kind of possibility-making in science that does not
come by luck. Surely, it will be objected, one cannot deny that there are experiments
that will never be possible for us, and questions that we cannot answer. Surely there
are, and there is no need to deny it, but a hazard lies in being sure that we know what
they are.
7 Conclusion
Experiment is superior to simulation, other things equal, on a given question where (1)
the answer depends on a feature of the world that is unknown and does not need to be
known in order to know that the experiment answers the question, and (2) the sample an
experimenter uses is of the same kind as the target such that the kindhood is projectible
to that unknown feature. In cases where (1) is not fulfilled, where what we do not know
does not affect the answer to the question, a simulation is just as good as an experiment.
In cases where we know that unknown factors do not affect the answer to the question,
we know that the simulation is just as good. The superiority that experiment has
in cases where both (1) and (2) hold comes from the experimenter being able to
blackbox, and refrain from making a model, hence assumptions about, the unknown
feature that affects the result, and puts the simulator one step behind. The legitimacy
of that blackboxing depends on the sample and the target in the experiment sharing a
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kindhood that is projectible to the relevant unknown property. Material similarity is
neither sufficient nor necessary for this. Critics are right that the Materiality Thesis is
false, but wrong to think the superiority of experiment depends on it.
The superiority of experiment defended here implies that, given our current back-
ground knowledge, and assuming the world is replete with kinds, there are any number
of questions that possible experiments could answer but no currently epistemically pos-
sible simulation could. Experiments on these matters would likely be more difficult
and costly than simulations that are epistemically possible for us, which would be on
other, better known, matters. Keeping in mind the distinction between experiment and
simulation, and judging their value accordingly, so far as and in the ways that that
is appropriate, has an important role to play in helping us to avoid narrowing of our
attention to the questions we already have the tools to answer.
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